BUILDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COALITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Peter K. Yu

Introduction

In October 2004, Argentina and Brazil introduced an important proposal to establish a development agenda within the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”). This proposal “call[ed] for WIPO to ‘fully incorporate’ and ‘to take immediate action in providing for the incorporation of a “Development Agenda” in the Organization’s work program.’” After years of deliberation through the Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda and the Inter-sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, the Development Agenda was finally adopted in October 2007.

The Agenda now includes “a series of recommendations to enhance the development dimension of the Organization’s activities.” These 45 recommended proposals were grouped into six different clusters, including technical assistance and capacity building; norm setting, flexibilities, public policy and public domain; technology transfer, information and communication technologies and access to knowledge; assessment, evaluation and impact studies; institutional matters including mandate and governance; and other issues.

Although the WIPO Development Agenda is key to reforming the current international intellectual property regime, similar pro-development initiatives have been undertaken in other international fora. Within the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations has led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration”) and a protocol to formally amend the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”). If the amendment is ratified by two-thirds of the WTO membership, the proposed article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement will allow countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.

In the World Summit on the Information Society, which was held in phases in Geneva and Tunis, less developed countries underscored their concerns over the widening digital divide between developed and less developed countries and the global importance of access to information and knowledge. At the World Health Assembly and within the Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health of the World Health Organization, the lack of access to essential medicines in less developed countries and the unintended consequences of the TRIPs Agreement have received growing attention and debate.  

Most recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provided an authoritative interpretive comment on article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which requires each state party to the Covenant to “recognize the right of everyone . . . [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author.”  

In an earlier resolution, the Sub-Commission on Human Rights also reminded governments “of the primacy of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements” and the importance of other human rights, such as the right to food and the right to health.  

In short, an extensive and wide-ranging array of pro-development efforts have been undertaken to revamp the international intellectual property regime. A large number of international fora are involved, and support from nongovernmental organizations, activist groups, and academics is abundant. In light of this momentum, less developed countries now have a rare and unprecedented opportunity to reshape the international intellectual property system in a way that would better advance their interests.  

If these countries are to succeed, however they need to take advantage of the current momentum, coordinate better with other countries and nongovernmental organizations, and more actively share with others their experience, knowledge, and best practices. With these goals in mind, this chapter explains how building intellectual property coalitions for development (“IPC4D”) can help less developed countries strengthen their collective bargaining position, influence negotiation outcomes, and promote effective and democratic decisionmaking in the international intellectual property regime. The chapter then discusses four coordination strategies that can be used to develop these coalitions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the various challenges confronting their creation and maintenance.  

**Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development**  

IPC4D is a concept that can take many different forms—blocs, alliances, regional integration, or other cooperative arrangement. The resulting coalitions have several attractive features. By teaming up countries with each other, the coalitions will have leverage that does not exist for each less developed country alone. If used strategically, they will allow countries to shape a pro-development agenda, articulate more coherent positions, or even enable them to establish a united negotiating front. The coalitions will also help less developed countries establish a more powerful voice in the international debates on public health, intellectual property, and international trade.  

Moreover, from the standpoint of international relations, the creation of IPC4D will help many less developed countries combat the external pressure each country will face on a one-on-one basis from the European Communities, the United States, or other powerful trading partners. If the appropriate arrangement is made, these coalitions may even facilitate the transfer of technology from the haves to the have-nots.
If regional alliances are set up—such as through regional economic integration; the institution of regional organizations, mutual recognition systems, procurement systems; the facilitation of regional cooperation in research and development; or the creation of regional competition enforcement mechanisms—there may be additional benefits. As Sisule Musungu and others have noted in a South Centre study:

A regional approach to the use of TRIPS flexibilities will enable similarly situated countries to address their constraints jointly by drawing on each others’ expertise and experience and by pooling and sharing resources and information. This approach has several advantages. First, it creates better policy conditions for addressing the challenges of implementing TRIPS flexibilities, which can be daunting for each individual country. Second, a common approach to improve access to essential medicines, knowledge, information and communication technologies, and other key development resources will enhance the efforts by developing countries to pursue common negotiating positions at the WTO and in other multilateral negotiations such as those on a substantive patent law at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In addition, a regional approach coincides with the objective of enhancing South-South cooperation on health and development.

Consequently, if strategically utilized, regional South-South frameworks will significantly help developing countries devise ways by which national constraints in the use of TRIPS flexibilities can be overcome. Likewise, two political scientists have noted that “[s]hared historical experiences among states of a particular region develop over time . . . , and the cultural affinities which facilitate commerce are more likely with neighbouring peoples than with those from afar.” It is, therefore, no surprise that Amrita Narlikar found “coalitions that utilize regionalism as a springboard for bargaining [to] be . . . ‘natural coalitions.’”

While IPC4D have many attractive features, building these coalitions is particularly important, for four reasons. First, the WTO has dominated current international intellectual property discussions, and group representation of less developed countries is particularly deficient in this international trading body. As Sonia Rolland recently noted, “[a]lthough the organization operates on a one-country-one-vote basis and on a consensus mechanism . . . , developing countries still find themselves in a relatively marginalized position and experience difficulties in linking their development agenda to multilateral trade negotiations.” Collective bargaining is therefore greatly needed.

Second, there is a rare and unprecedented opportunity for less developed countries to reshape the intellectual property debate. At the recent WTO Ministerial Conferences in Doha, Cancún, and Hong Kong, these countries have built a considerable momentum in pushing for reforms that would recalibrate the balance of the international trading system. Greater collaboration, therefore, would help less developed countries take advantage of the ongoing momentum while protecting the gains they already obtained in recent negotiations.

Third, which is related to the second, greater collaboration among less developed countries is needed in light of the impending closure of the Doha Round. Without the urgency brought about by September 11 and the anthrax attacks and the United States’ general interest in having greater cooperation with the less developed world, one has to wonder whether the Doha
BUILDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COALITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Round could be negotiated as far as it got. If less developed countries need to protect the gains they made in the Doha Round, they need to increase their collective bargaining leverage.

Finally, the international intellectual property regime has become increasingly complex, creating what I have termed the “international intellectual property regime complex.”18 Because of its complexity, this conglomerate regime is likely to harm less developed countries more than they harm developed countries.19 The growing complexities have also upset the existing coalition dynamics between actors and institutions within the international trading system, thus threatening to reduce the gains made by less developed countries through past coalition-building efforts.20

Coordination Strategies for Developing IPC4D

To help us develop IPC4D, this chapter discusses four different coordination strategies: (1) the initiation of South-South alliances; (2) the facilitation of North-South cooperation; (3) joint participation in the WTO dispute settlement process; and (4) the development of regional or pro-development fora. This section explains the need for and benefits of each strategy. Because the strategies are not intended to be mutually exclusive, countries seeking to strengthen their bargaining position are encouraged to maximize the impact by combining these strategies together.

South-South Alliances

Since the failure of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún (“Cancún Ministerial”) in 2003, the United States has initiated a divide-and-conquer strategy that seeks to reward countries that are willing to work with the United States while undermining efforts by Brazil, India, and other G–20 members to establish a united negotiating front for less developed countries.21 As Robert Zoellick, the former United States Trade Representative, wrote in the Financial Times shortly after the failed ministerial conference, the United States will separate the can-do countries from the won’t-do countries and “will move towards free trade with [only] can-do countries.”22

This isolation strategy was not new; it was used by the United States to increase its bargaining leverage during the TRIPs negotiations. When the TRIPs Agreement was being negotiated, the United States used section 301 sanctions to isolate major opposition countries, like Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand.23 South Korea, for example, was threatened with sanctions for inadequate protection for computer programs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals and in the copyright, patent, and trademark areas.24 Likewise, the United States Trade Representative listed on its Section 301 Priority Watch List or Watch List five of the ten hardliner countries that refused to expand the GATT mandate to cover substantive intellectual property issues.25

If less developed countries are to counterbalance the United States’ divide-and-conquer strategy, lest more TRIPs-plus standards be developed at both the multilateral and regional levels, they need to initiate a combine-and-conquer strategy. Simply put, they need to build more coalitions within the less developed world. A recent successful example was the development of the G–20 during the Cancún Ministerial. Although its success was short-lived, the Group was
instrumental in preventing the WTO member states from reaching agreement on such issues as investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. Its success eventually led to the premature ending of the ministerial conference and the Bush administration’s change of focus from multilateral negotiations to bilateral or regional agreements.

Today, there is a tendency to view bilateral or regional agreements with skepticism, partly as a result of their wide and controversial uses by the European Communities and the United States to ratchet up global intellectual property standards. However, these agreements are not always destructive to the international intellectual property regime, and they remain an effective way to build coalitions within the less developed world. At times, they may even help promote multilateralism by fostering common positions among participating countries.

Moreover, regional trade agreements hold a unique place in the WTO system. Because “the GATT and the WTO recognize regional trade groups and give them certain rights[,] . . . being a party to a recognized [regional trade agreement may be] the only way to gain legal status as a group of members in the WTO.”26 Given the importance of these agreements in the WTO system, it is, therefore, important to distinguish South-South agreements from their unpopular counterparts—North-South agreements, such as those free trade agreements pushed by the United States and economic partnership agreements initiated by the European Communities.

**North-South Cooperation**

Although the WTO and the international intellectual property regime remain heavily state-centered, the participation of non-state actors (such as multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations) and sub-state agents has grown considerably. During the Cancún Ministerial, “most high-profile [nongovernmental organizations], such as Greenpeace, Oxfam, and Public Citizen, explicitly backed the developing countries’ stand and heavily criticized developed countries, in particular the US and the EU, for a lack of consideration for their poorer trading partners.”27 While “[s]ome operated as think tanks in supporting the agenda of developing countries[, o]thers issued statements expressing political support for the demands of the G20.”28

In addition, sub-state agents have become increasingly active. As Chris Alden noted with respect to China’s government and business ties in Africa, Chinese provincial and municipal authorities have undertaken major initiatives to establish formal and informal ties in South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Angola, and Nigeria.29 In recent years, there has also been an interesting emergence of non-national systems, such as the adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) in October 1999 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private not-for-profit corporation in California.30

Thus, instead of focusing on state-to-state relationships, less developed countries need to better understand the importance and challenges for working with nongovernmental organizations and sub-state agents and within non-national systems. They also “need to work consistently with U.S. and European political allies to alter the U.S. and European domestic political contexts.”31 In doing so, these allies will be able to obtain support within the domestic deliberative processes in developed countries that is similar to the support they have already
received within their own countries or in the less developed world. Even if these countries are unable to obtain their desirable policy outcomes through the political processes in the developed world, their foreign allies may be able to significantly reduce the political pressure developed countries will exert upon their less developed counterparts.

To date, there has been significant collaboration between policymakers in less developed countries and nongovernmental organizations in both developed and less developed countries. Academics and the media in the North can also play very important roles. Academics and their institutions, for example, can help identify policy choices and negotiating strategies and to develop technical capacity in less developed countries have been widely noted. Likewise, less developed countries can increase their leverage and negotiating outcomes if they are able to “capture[] the attention of the mass media in industrial countries and persuade[] the media to reframe the issue using a reference point more favorable to the coalition’s position.” As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos noted: “Had TRIPS been framed as a public health issue, the anxiety of mass publics in the US and other Western states might have become a factor in destabilizing the consensus that US business elites had built around TRIPS.”

The WTO Dispute Settlement Process

One of the major features of the WTO is its mandatory dispute settlement process. While the United States and the European Communities have dominated the process in the first few years of existence of the WTO, especially when the disputes involved the TRIPs Agreement, less developed countries have had more frequent use of the process in recent years. Since the turn of the millennium, Brazil and India have made much more frequent and extensive use of the process. While they initially have used the process primarily against less powerful WTO member states, such as Argentina, Turkey, Mexico, Peru, and Poland, they have started to use the process more aggressively against powerful WTO member states, like the European Communities and the United States.

Because globalization and international trade have deeply affected domestic policies, participating in the WTO dispute settlement process is now of paramount importance. Such participation will allow countries to develop WTO jurisprudence in a way that, in turn, would shape the ongoing negotiations in the areas of international trade, intellectual property, and even public health. This is what Professor Shaffer has described as negotiation “in the shadow of” the WTO dispute settlement process. As he explained:

Participation in WTO judicial processes is arguably more important than is participation in analogous judicial processes for shaping law in national systems. The difficulty of amending or interpreting WTO law through the WTO political process enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence. WTO law requires consensus to modify, resulting in a rigid legislative system, with rule modifications occurring through infrequent negotiating rounds. Because of the complex bargaining process, rules often are drafted in a vague manner, thereby delegating de facto power to the WTO dispute settlement system to effectively make WTO law through interpretation.

As a result of the increased importance of WTO jurisprudence and the rigidity of the WTO political process, those governments that are able to participate most actively in the WTO dispute settlement system are best-positioned to effectively shape the law’s interpretation and application over time.
Such an approach makes a lot of sense. After all, there is no indication that the WTO dispute settlement panels are biased toward stronger protection of intellectual property rights. In the decisions issued thus far, the panelists have focused narrowly on the language of the TRIPs Agreement, taking into consideration the recognized international rules of interpretation, the context of the TRIPs negotiations, and the past and subsequent developments of treaties governing the areas. In Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, the panel even referred favorably to the limitations and public interest safeguards contained in the TRIPs Agreement. As the panel declared: “Both the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when [examining the words of the limiting conditions in article 30] as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its object and purposes.”

This decision was particularly important, because it was issued before the conclusion of the Doha Declaration.

Moreover, as I noted elsewhere in the context of the United States’ ongoing WTO dispute with China over the lack of intellectual property enforcement, the European Communities or the United States did not win all of the disputes “litigated” before the Dispute Settlement Body. In June 2000, for example, the United States lost its dispute with the European Communities over section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which enables restaurants and small establishments to play copyrighted music without compensating copyright holders. In a subsequent ruling, section 211(a)(2) of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, which prohibited the registration or renewal of trademarks previously abandoned by trademark holders whose business and assets have been confiscated under Cuban law, was found to be inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement.

In addition, the WTO panel curtailed the ability of the U.S. administration to pursue retaliatory actions before exhausting all remedies permissible under the WTO rules, even though it nominally upheld sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974. Most recently, the Caribbean islands of Antigua and Barbuda successfully challenged U.S. laws on Internet and telephone gambling. In United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, an arbitration panel determined that “the annual level of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Antigua is US$21 million.”

While many of the United States’ losses came from its archrival, the European Communities, the WTO dispute settlement process is not reserved for use by powerful WTO member states. The last dispute has shown that, in the WTO process, even two tiny Caribbean islands can prevail over a trading giant like the United States. One can imagine how effective the use of this process can be when less developed countries team up with others as co-complainants or third parties. On the one hand, this collective effort can pull together scarce economic and legal resources to defend laws that seek to exploit the flexibilities provided by the TRIPs Agreement and explicitly reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration. On the other hand, less developed countries can use these resources to design effective strategies to challenge non-TRIPs-compliant legislation in developed countries.

Compared to the uncoordinated arrangement where each country has to file a separate complaint, or join the complainant as a third party, the collaborative strategy has at least five benefits. First, countries will be able to significantly reduce the costs of WTO litigation, thus lowering the threshold for determining whether it would be worthwhile to file a WTO complaint.
In his earlier analysis, Professor Shaffer showed how it might not be worthwhile for a small or poor country to file a WTO complaint even when there was a high economic stake. Based on 2004 figures, he found that “an average WTO claim costs in the range of US$300,000–400,000 in attorneys’ fees.” While $200,000 of potential loss in trade may be highly important to the economy of a small, poor country, such a loss does not always justify taking the case to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body or defending it there. Instead, these countries often give up their valid claims. If they are sued, they often settle the claims by either abandoning experiments that are permissible under the WTO agreements or by transplanting laws from abroad against their wishes and benefits.

This is particularly problematic, from the standpoint of the TRIPs negotiations. One of the primary reasons why less developed countries reluctantly agreed to increase intellectual property protection is the ability to use the WTO dispute settlement process as a bulwark against developed countries’ coercive, and often unilateral, tactics. As some less developed countries claimed at the time of the TRIPs negotiations, it would be pointless for them to join the WTO if the United States were able to continue imposing unilateral sanctions despite their membership. Unfortunately, the high start-up costs required by the WTO dispute settlement process have made it very difficult for less developed countries to benefit from their hard-earned bargains through the WTO negotiations.

More problematic, the lack of participation by some less developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement process can hurt the protection of other less developed countries. As Professor Shaffer reminded us: “Who participates in the institutional process affects which arguments will be presented, which, in turn, affects how the competing concerns over patent protection, public health, and market competition will be weighed.” Thus, if the WTO rules are to be shaped to advance the interests of the less developed world, greater participation by less developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement process is needed.

Second, less developed countries can benefit from the additional expertise and resources provided by other less developed countries. Instead of spending a substantial amount of money on outside counsel, or spending even more in developing local expertise, less developed countries can take advantage of the cost-sharing arrangement and devote the saved resources to improving the living standards of their nationals. If these countries team up with countries like Brazil, China, or India, they can benefit from even more sophisticated expertise. Because the latter are active litigants in the WTO dispute settlement process, over the years they have developed considerable expertise that can be used by or share with other less developed countries.

Third, as repeat players in WTO litigation, less developed countries will benefit from the economies of scale in deploying legal resources. They are also more likely to possess the mindset of planning legal strategies that will help them advance the interests of the less developed world and to strengthen their overall legal positions, rather than strategies that seek to win only one case at a time. In doing so, these countries can use the WTO dispute settlement process effectively to shape both the judicial interpretation and the future negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement in a pro-development manner. They may even be able to regain the momentum less developed countries lost during the TRIPs negotiations due to their limited understanding of intellectual property rights and weak bargaining power. Thus far, the European Communities and the United States are able to advance their commercial interests through the
BUILDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COALITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

WTO dispute settlement process, due partly to their predominant use of that process. However, greater strategic use of the process by less developed countries may greatly curtail the ability by developed countries to advance those interests.

Fourth, as a group, less developed countries do not need to worry as much about the backlashes they will receive when they alone file a complaint against the European Communities or the United States before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. As William Davey noted, when countries do not face each other often as adversaries in the WTO process, “initiation of a complaint would be something of a slap in the face. The ignominy of a loss would also loom larger.” By taking collective action, many otherwise infrequent players in the WTO dispute settlement process will become more frequent players. As they become involved in more complaints against the European Communities or the United States, and as each of these parties has its share of wins and losses, the impact of a WTO dispute on diplomatic relations will be greatly reduced.

Finally, as commentators have rightly questioned, less developed countries may not “have the diplomatic or economic muscle to ensure that the decision is implemented” even if they win their case. Indeed, as Professor Davey has pointed out, there is a good chance that “even massive retaliation by a small country would be unnoticeable by a larger one.” Thus, by uniting together, less developed countries may be able to have more leverage at the enforcement level by increasing the economic impact of trade countermeasures permitted by the WTO dispute settlement panel.

Regional or Pro-development Fora

Regional or pro-development fora are particularly effective means for coordinating efforts by less developed countries in the areas of public health, intellectual property, and international trade. These fora will provide the much-needed focal points for countries to share experience, knowledge, and best practices and to coordinate negotiation and litigation strategies. Through these fora, less developed countries could “(i) raise political awareness of certain members . . . ; (ii) help define the agenda, prior to the actual negotiations . . . ; and (iii) achieve particular regulatory outcomes on a particular issue or economic sector or sub-sector . . . and defend interests in dispute settlement.”

In addition, these fora allow countries to reframe issues “in a way that eases impasses,” thus providing a mechanism to balance interests internal to the group while resolving conflicts or negotiation deadlocks before enlarging the negotiations to include some developed countries or the entire developed world. They also facilitate “a pooling of organisational resources, and enable countries will ill-defined interests to avail themselves of the research efforts of allies and a possible country-wise division of research and labour across issue areas.”

Through these fora, the interests of the participating countries would be better and more symmetrically represented. The fora would also “help build capacity for the group’s members as they would gain leverage through access to a more central and streamlined channel of information (through the group representation) and in turn be able to better formulate their own policy positions.” In addition, regional or pro-development fora could help improve the human capital and WTO know-how of less developed countries by “better coordinat[ing] training of
developing country officials and non-governmental representatives.” These capacity-building functions are especially important, considering the fact that some less developed countries have given up their participation in international fora due to a lack of financial resources or political circumstances.

As commentators have pointed out, many less developed countries “lack the resources . . . to send delegates to these fora and thus have resorted to using nongovernmental organizations . . . to represent their interests.” In one instance, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, a London-based environmental nongovernmental organization, negotiated a deal to represent Sierra Leone before the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. Even if countries are willing to send delegates, they may have become formally inactive due to their failure to pay dues for a certain period of time. In the WTO, for example, their inactive status would prevent them from chairing any bodies within the organization. Many delegations are also affected by their limited institutional capacity, delegation size, geopolitical capital, and overall expertise.

Moreover, coordination at the regional level and among less developed countries is important in light of the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements initiated by the European Communities and the United States. Because those agreements tend to transplant laws based on models developed in their home countries, they are notorious for ignoring local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health conditions of less developed countries. Even worse, these agreements sometimes call for a higher level of protection than what is currently offered in the developed world. If the European Communities or the United States does not see it beneficial to have higher protection, one has to wonder why protection needs to be strengthened in countries that have even more limited resources and that do not possess adequate safeguards and correction mechanisms.

If that is not problematic enough, it is not uncommon for less developed countries to be “induced” into signing conflicting agreements with both the European Communities and the United States. While these two trading powers are interested in having strong global intellectual property standards, there remain a large number of intellectual property conflicts between the two. In the copyright context, for example, they take different positions on “the protection of moral rights, fair use, the first sale doctrine, the work-made-for-hire arrangement, and protection against private copying in the digital environment.” They also approach the patent filing process differently and greatly disagree on how to protect geographical indications. Indeed, had the United States refused to include geographical indications in the proposed GATT treaty, the European Communities’ initial ambivalent position toward the creation of the TRIPs Agreement might not have changed.

In view of these differences, conflicts are virtually unavoidable if less developed countries sign the trade agreements supplied by both the European Communities and the United States without appropriate review and modification. To be certain, it is not the fault of these trading powers that policymakers in less developed countries were unable to review or modify the agreement; oftentimes, it was the result of a lack of resources, expertise, leadership, negotiation sophistication, or bargaining power. Many policymakers in less developed countries are also blinded by the benefits their countries may receive in other trade areas under a package deal—or, worse, they are just too eager to appease, or develop “friendship” with, the trading
powers. Nevertheless, it is still highly lamentable that these countries enter into conflicting agreements that can be avoided with more caution, coordination, and information. It is bad enough to be forced to sign a bilateral agreement that does not meet local conditions. It is even worse to be put in a position where they have to juggle two conflicting agreements that do not meet local conditions and that are impossible to honor.

Fortunately for less developed countries, regional or pro-development fora may provide the much-needed institutional response to the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for stronger intellectual property standards and to further reduce the policy space to develop intellectual property, trade, and public health policies. While the always short-staffed Advisory Centre on WTO Law provides legal advice and support in WTO matters and trains government officials in WTO law, they do not provide assistance in coordinating political, judicial, and forum-shifting strategies in an increasingly complex international intellectual property lawmaking environment. They also provide very limited assistance in developing negotiating strategies concerning the bilateral or regional trade agreements initiated by the European Communities and the United States.

By bringing countries together, these fora would allow policymakers in less developed countries to share their latest experience and lessons concerning these agreements. In doing so, the participating countries would have more information to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the potential treaties. They would also be able to anticipate problems and potential side-effects created by these treaties. They might even be able to better design prophylactic or correction measures that would become handy should the treaties prove to be unsuitable for their countries.

Finally, as Sonia Rolland pointed out, “the ability or inability of developing countries to form and sustain effective coalitions in the WTO depends not only on the coalitions’ inherent characteristics and the political environment, but also on the institutional and legal framework in which they operate.” Except for supranational entities like the European Communities, special classifications like least developed countries, or recognized regional trade agreements, the WTO offers very limited support for representation by groups in policy deliberation. Thus, if less developed countries can use these regional or pro-development fora to develop strategies to push for greater legal or structural changes within international organizations that will make group representation easier to obtain and the institution more coalition-friendly, they are more likely to be able to increase their bargaining leverage and to develop a stronger voice for the less developed world. After all, “the ability to sustain developing country coalitions depends in part on the WTO’s legal structure. . . . [M]embers whose interests might [also] be more effectively served if they are promoted by a group strategy could benefit from a legal framework that better supports developing country coalitions or groupings.”

Challenges to Building IPC4D

Although collective action can play important roles in the international intellectual property regime and the use of coordination strategies can help less developed countries strengthen their collective bargaining position, there are still many remaining challenges. The length and scope of this chapter do not allow me to explore ways to respond to these challenges.
(These responses are addressed elsewhere.\textsuperscript{77}) It is nonetheless important to highlight here the potential challenges for building IPC4D.

Historically, less developed countries have had only limited success in using coalition-building efforts to increase their bargaining leverage.\textsuperscript{78} Their lack of success was perhaps caused by the fact that these coalitions were usually too ambitious: they were set up to include a broad mandate, diverse membership, complex issues, and incompatible interests. As Amrita Narlikar has shown, issue-based coalitions work best for small and very specialized economies with common profiles and interests, such as those “small island economies with similar geographic/strategic endowments, concentrated interests in tourism exports, and travel imports.” These coalitions, however, do not work well for larger, more diverse, and often internally-conflicting economies.\textsuperscript{79} They also do not work well for a large bloc of less developed countries that have various strengths, sizes, and interests and that are only linked together in an ad hoc fashion.\textsuperscript{80}

The lack of success by less developed countries to build or maintain coalitions can be further attributed to their “high dependence on the developed countries as the source of capital, whether it is provided through the IMF or World Bank, or through investment bankers and securities exchanges.”\textsuperscript{81} Such independence was further aggravated by the lack of stability in the economies of less developed countries—for example, in India during the TRIPs negotiations and in South America during the negotiation of the draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology.\textsuperscript{82}

Another challenge for less developed countries concerns how to set up an alliance in a way that would prevent the more powerful members from dominating their much weaker and more dependent partners. Because countries with more human capital, technical knowledge, and legal expertise may abuse their leadership roles at the expense of others, it is important to build safeguards into the coalitions to protect the weaker members and to allow them to retain their autonomy and identity. If IPC4D are to be successfully built and maintained, it is also important to develop trust among the participating members so that they can work together closely without worrying about potential exploitation.

These safeguards are particularly important in light of the rapidly growing economic interests of the larger less developed countries, such as Brazil, China, and India. The latter will grow much faster than the others as the world becomes more globalized and the volume of international trade increases. In many areas of international trade, they already “have gained relatively more than their poorer counterparts from the multilateral trade process [and] have increasingly found themselves adopting positions divergent from those of [their poorer counterparts] on the question of preferential access to rich country markets.”\textsuperscript{83} If history repeats itself, as in the cases of the United States, Germany, Japan, and South Korea, some of these countries eventually will want stronger intellectual property protection once they become economically developed. They may also benefit from the continued lack of manufacturing capacity in other less developed countries.

Finally, there are “IP-irrelevant” factors that would make it difficult for the countries to cooperate with each other,\textsuperscript{84} such as xenophobia, nationalism, racism, mistrust, resentment. No matter how much more globalized and interdependent the world has become, some countries will
always remain reluctant to participate in these coalitions, either because of historical conflicts, border disputes, cultural differences, or spillover disputes from other areas.

The existence of these challenges, however, does not doom the IPC4D project; rather, it demonstrates how coalition building is always a work in progress that requires care, vision, and continuous attention between and among the various parties. It also suggests the importance of using regional approaches to alleviate the impact of some of these factors. If the interests of the weaker alliance members are to be protected, a clear alliance agreement and a carefully designed benefit-sharing arrangement need to be put in place when the alliance is set up. It is also important for the weaker members to obtain a better understanding of how they can take advantage of the coalitions when the interests of the members are still close to each other.

Conclusion

There are many benefits to building IPC4D. There are some challenges, however. If countries are to work together to develop successful coalitions, they need to clearly articulate their goals, understand each other better, and work out mutually beneficial arrangements. In doing so, the development of IPC4D is not a mere hope, but a realistic goal. The resulting coalitions will not only be able to reduce the ongoing push by the European Communities and the United States to ratchet up global intellectual property standards, but will also help enlarge the policy space less developed countries need to develop their intellectual property, trade, and public health policies. With greater coordination and leverage, they may even be able to establish, shape, and enlarge a pro-development negotiating agenda that would recalibrate the balance of the international intellectual property system.

*Copyright © 2008 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law & Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong; Research Fellow, Center for Studies of Intellectual Property Rights, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law.


7 Although the initial deadline for ratification was December 1, 2007, the deadline has been recently extended for another two years. William New, TRIPS Council Extends Health Amendment; Targets Poor Nations’ Needs, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=798. As of this writing, slightly over a quarter of the 151 WTO member states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and most recently members of the European Communities, have ratified the proposed amendment. WTO, Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (Aug. 2, 2007).

8 The TRIPs Agreement distinguishes between developing and least developed countries. This Article uses “less developed countries” to denote both developing and least developed countries. When referring to the TRIPS Agreement, however, this Article returns to the terms “developing countries” and “least developed countries.”


See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006).


Id. at 483; accord NARLIKAR, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that “GATT officials reiterated the operation of ‘consensus’-based decision-making procedures, and refused to acknowledge the existence of some well-entrenched coalitions”).


Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standards-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 765, 774 (2002). These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia.


JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 576 (2000).


Shaffer, supra note 31, at 470.


See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000).


Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶3.189, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).

Doha Declaration, supra note 4, ¶5 (2002).

Shaffer, supra note 31, at 473.

See id. at 472.

See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 21, at 372.

Shaffer, supra note 31, at 465.

See id. at 475.
Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development

40 See id. at 474.
41 See id. at 470.
42 See id.
44 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 37, at 945.
45 Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 52, at 90.
46 Id. at 102.
48 Rolland, supra note 26, at 499.
49 John S. Odell, Introduction to Negotiating Trade, supra note 32, at 1, 16.
50 See Rolland, supra note 26, at 501.
52 See Rolland, supra note 26, at 512.
53 Id.
54 Shaffer, supra note 31, at 478.
57 Narlikar, supra note 16, at 15.
58 See Rolland, supra note 26, at 529.
59 As the Trade Act of 2002 stated:
   “The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property are . . . to further promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through . . . ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law . . . .”

61 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 21, at 407.
64 See Watal, supra note 24, at 23.
65 See Shaffer, supra note 31, at 478.
66 Rolland, supra note 26, at 505.
67 Id. at 485.
71 See Rolland, supra note 26, at 510.
72 Abbott, Future of IPRs, supra note 78, at 42
74 Rolland, supra note 26, at 536.
75 “IP-irrelevant factors” are those factors that are largely unaffected by intellectual property protection. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind. L.J. 827, 852–53 (2007).